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  Kevin Melchionne
Abstract
Acquired taste is an integral part of the cultivation of taste. In
this essay, I identify acquired taste as a form of intentional
belief acquisition or adaptive preference formation,
distinguishing it from ordinary or discovered taste. This
account of acquired taste allows for the role of self-deception
in the development of taste. I discuss the value of acquired
taste in the overall development of taste as well as the ways
that an over-reliance on acquired taste can distort overall
taste.
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1. Fake It 'til You Make It
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We have all been offered the chance to sample drinks, music,
or art that we have not liked, only to be met with the
rejoinder that the offering is an acquired taste. My friend
Rachod, an enthusiast of scotch, is always ready to counter my
grimace with this assurance. He can inform me about the
subtle differences between an assortment of distilleries and I
am inclined to believe that scotch, similar to wine, rewards
close attention. Like Rachod, admirers of dissonant music, dive
bars, abstract painting, cigars, among others, defend their
interests as acquired tastes. Acquiring taste is generally looked
upon as a respectable pursuit, promising refined and exotic,
though often difficult, pleasures. Acquired taste demands a
determination to work against the grain of my existing
preferences, introducing tension and effort where I expect
satisfaction. With my own taste already satisfying―though too
limited to help me to appreciate what my drinking companion
is offering―it should not be surprising if I am hesitant to
pursue what has already eluded me. Why set out on a chase
for new satisfactions when my own are immediate and
available without effort?
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The answer is that acquired tastes can be rewarding. Acquired
taste jump-starts new satisfactions where I do not initially find
them. Through acquired taste, I grow in my capacity to enjoy
what the world has to offer. The shiver down my spine at my
first sampling of sushi was not one of delight. I was repelled
by the cold slug of fish and the horseradish. Playing along, I
smothered the second piece in soy sauce, grateful for the
familiar saltiness. Soon, though, I was branching out from
California rolls to unagi and uni, tuning into the freshness and
subtle variations in flavor. As for Rachod's scotch, I am still
trying. Surrounded by advertising, friends, and experts, we are
constantly asked, pestered even, to acquire a taste for one
thing or another. These entreaties come with the promise of
some new satisfaction. But when should I take the promised
rewards of acquired taste seriously? When should I dismiss

them as not for me and quite possibly utter bullshit?
Harry Frankfurt has observed that in almost every sphere of
life, there is a tremendous amount of bullshit.[1] The realm of
taste probably has more than its fair share. In many respects,
bullshit in taste is very much like bullshit elsewhere, and so
Frankfurt's account, despite its focus on truth rather than
preference or satisfaction, is helpful. Frankfurt sees bullshit as
a kind of deception that falls short of lying. Bullshit is different
from lying in that it has a different relationship to the truth. In
order to maintain a deception, the liar must have a finer sense
of the truth than the non-liar. Lying requires what Frankfurt
calls 'sharp focus,' that is, a certain lucidity, even
craftsmanship. The liar has concern for the truth because it is
specifically what the liar seeks to lead people away from. Lying
is not possible without knowing the truth. In contrast, bullshit
requires no such knowledge. Bullshit is not so much a lack of
truth as a lack of concern for the truth. Rather than sharply
focused, it is hazy. If only by accident, bullshit could turn out
to be true, but that would hardly matter to the bullshitter.
What the bullshitter seeks to deceive his listeners about is that
"the truth-values of his statements are of no central interest
to him."[2] Thus, bullshit is not so much falsehood as fakery.
When we fall into bullshit, we act like we know what we are
talking about without caring if we really do. The deception of
others lies not in getting people to believe a particular false
claim but in getting them to believe we are serious about what
we are talking about.
Taste is the truth about what pleases us as creators and
spectators. But where is the deception? If taste is about our
responses, who is there to deceive? In bullshit or counterfeit
taste, we mainly deceive ourselves. The disregard for truth is a
disregard for the truth about our own responses to works of
art or other objects that we approach aesthetically. When
taste is inauthentic, we are unconcerned with what we really
like, remaining satisfied with the impression or performance of
liking things. Counterfeit taste is the disconnection from
preferences. When this performance of taste dominates, we
become culture victims. Like the fashion victim who blindly
follows fashion without any sense of its appropriateness for her
body or personal style, the culture victim is someone whose
overall taste smacks of a similar inauthenticity. As culture
victims, what we fake is our feelings. Although the extremes of
the art world makes for especially fertile soil for counterfeit
taste, the culture victim thrives anywhere that inauthentic
acquired taste takes the place of real preferences. We become
culture victims whenever our motivations for having a certain
taste drive us beyond the reality of our feelings and lead us to
assign to ourselves responses and preferences that we just do
not really have.
The cultivation of taste is an ongoing process of developing our
capacity to identify in experience the parts relevant to our
deriving satisfaction from experience. In a cultivated life, we
have more experience with greater sophistication and
absorption. We become more adept at seeking it out. We are
better able to glean from other people useful information
about their preferences and apply it to our own interests. We
try on these experiences, liking or disliking them. When
strolling through a museum, surfing the internet, hiking a

wooded path, or even mall-crawling, our immediate
impressions usually guide us. Delighting in these responses is
one of the most reliable and powerful satisfactions in aesthetic
life. For the most part, we discover what we like rather than
choose it. Discovered taste, or what Edmund Burke called
natural relish, requires no work of acquisition, no overcoming
of resistance.[3] Discovery reinforces the sense that my taste
is not a creature of the media professionals but something
akin to a personal possession, a distinctive sign of my
individuality, of the realness of my responses to the world.
Sometimes, though, it is also helpful if we reach out for new
experiences and new satisfactions that we do not already
have. We can determine that we ought to like or wish we liked
something that we simply do not like. In these cases, we can
intentionally acquire the taste to which we aspire. To acquire
taste, we put aside our current feelings and engage in a
performance that hopefully puts us in the frame of mind to
like what we wish to like. One common approach is to act as if
we already had the desired taste.[4] Acquired taste starts as a
form of pretending that later becomes real: we act as if we
had the belief or preference in the hopes of eventually having
it in fact. Going through the motions of appreciation hopefully
instills the appropriate responses. If Rachod passes me a
tumbler of scotch that I wish to like but do not expect to, I
can act as if I enjoyed the peaty aroma and scorching aftertaste. In so doing, I try to notice the distinctive qualities of the
scotch that I sample and assign a positive evaluation to them.
The familiar maxim, "Fake it 'til you make it," captures this
process aptly.
Trying to like what we do not really like is a common feature
of our lives. Acquired taste is normal, even healthy. If our
taste were limited by what we happened to like easily, it would
evolve only along the narrow paths already opened for us. We
live in a social world where we get to exchange tips about
great films and music, wines and recipes. Others'
endorsements encourage our efforts. For the open-minded,
taste is constantly challenged in this way. Even the mildly
curious are likely to encounter all sorts of possibilities for
experience in the ordinary course of life. Most offerings come
with opinions telling us how we ought to receive and evaluate
them. There is little doubt that the force of this guidance is
responsible for much of what we observe as cultural opinion.
Acquired taste is possible because convictions about taste are
open to suggestion. This vulnerability allows us to have new
and more refined experiences and to listen to the suggestions
of others.
As far as it goes, this willingness to change is fine. But it is a
double-edged sword. For it is also what allows advertisers to
exploit the common desire to improve ourselves by improving
what we like (and, of course, what we buy). Bullshit taste sets
in when acquired taste runs amok and the detachment from
existing feelings necessary to acquire taste becomes a
disregard for feelings altogether. Inauthentic acquired taste
leads to a self-forgetting numbness as we over-commit to
trying to like what we really do not like. As culture victims, we
forget our own preferences and pleasures. The normal pattern
of open-mindedness and exploration disconnects from the rest
of our beliefs and preferences and is transformed into a

counterfeit performance. Bullshit taste flourishes because its
possibility is built right into the very process of cultivating
taste. With the culture victim, the capacity to detach from
preferences in order to explore new possibilities for experience
is distorted. Just as excessive bullshit, unlike lying, weakens
one's ability to speak and perceive the truth, so too does
inauthentic acquired taste, through chronic disregard, makes it
difficult to remain in touch with one's responses.
Culture victims are no less the holders of what they take to be
convictions. Bullshit taste does not flourish because the art
world is full of goofball artists, fatuous critics, and gullible
collectors. The culture victims are not necessarily ignorant. Nor
do they necessarily have bad taste. Counterfeit taste may be
quite sophisticated and it may reflect a well informed
background in art history, theory, and criticism. Inauthentic
taste is derived from the very structure of taste, from the way
we come to like what we like and change when it seems right
to do so.
The important yet ambivalent role of acquired taste in the
normal cultivation of taste is one reason to give it a closer
look. In order to understand the culture victim, we need to
understand how we learn to like what we do not like, in other
words, how we acquire taste. Just what is acquired taste? Will
the acquisition of a new taste serve me well? Or am I destined
rather to become something of a slave to the task of acquiring
it, in other words, a culture victim? When is acquired taste
respectable or authentic? Is it ever downright fraudulent?
2. Deciding to Like
It is common to want to have mental states such as beliefs,
desires, judgments or preferences different from those that
one actually has. One might go about satisfying that wish by
intentionally acquiring the desired belief or preference. With
intentionally acquired mental states, one changes beliefs for
motivations other than the truth or reasonableness of those
beliefs. In order to avoid the discomfort of, for example,
disappointment, one adjusts one's desires to accord with what
is feasible. One might also adjust one's beliefs about the
desired but unattainable object. For instance, I might cope
with not having received a larger office at my new employer
by marshalling a preference for coziness or newly emphasizing
the draftiness of the larger office. Commonly known as 'sour
grapes,' philosophers also call this process 'adaptive
preference formation' or 'intentional belief acquisition.'[5] The
term 'sour grapes' is a catch-all for a constellation of adaptive
belief strategies. The most familiar example of intentional
belief acquisition is La Fontaine's fable of the fox and the
grapes. Knowing that the appetizing grapes high on the vine
are beyond his reach, the fox consoles himself with the new,
convenient belief that he does not like grapes as they are too
sour. Or on another reading, the grapes on this particular vine
are too green and would not be worth having if he could reach
them.[6] That the fox can not have the grapes leads him to
change his opinion of their desirability. Sour grapes often
involve a retroactive re-weighting of options in order to feel
better about a choice or a result, such as weighting the value
of coziness much higher after taking occupancy of a small
office than I ordinarily would have. Sometimes, choices are

made for reasons other than preference and afterwards,
preferences change to fit the choice. I choose the small office
in order to avoid offending more senior colleagues, then,
afterwards, attribute my choice to a preference for coziness. In
sour grapes, we may change our beliefs wholesale or only
selectively emphasize factors in order to achieve a more
satisfying outlook.
Although sour grapes are not thought of as very respectable,
there is an inevitable role for this response in our lives. When
knowing the truth cannot help us and may have unwelcome
consequences such as disappointment and despair, it is
understandable that we would wish things were otherwise.
Maintaining illusions is often counter productive but it can
sometimes have a positive effect on our well being.[7]
Adjusting preferences is one way to achieve this well being.
Through sour grapes, we adapt to having less or having
something different than what we originally wanted.
Changing one's beliefs for reasons other than their truth or
rightness is not always as easy as it sounds. Luc Bovens writes
that, typically, attempts to change our mental states must be
deliberate projects, rather than mere acts of will. "A common
strategy is to act as if one already had the projected mental
state. To complete such a project successfully is to acquire the
mental state in question intentionally through as if actions."[8]
One may be up against one's own deeply ingrained disposition,
strongly held beliefs or both. However, taste is one of those
mental states that is tough to intentionally bring about. Trying
to like something is a bit like trying to relax or trying to fall
asleep. The more you try, the less you are likely to attain your
goal. The as if activity discussed in the previous section is one
common approach that may get around this obstacle. As if
activity is a 'psychological mechanism,' a kind of indirect
mental causation bringing about a change in a mental state
such as a belief or preference without the benefit of a reason.
If I am successful, the process of pretending allows me to
program the responses that I am supposed to have. As if
activity can also be more than a trick on the mind; it can
enhance my sensitivity to what it is that I wish to perceive. As
the role of habituation is often crucial, an as if project can
serve as a way of introducing myself to different, and
hopefully better, habits with the prospect of eventually
instilling them in a more substantial way. There is no
guarantee that I will develop this perceptual ability or
genuinely like what I discover with it. I might have to try a lot
of scotch over a stretch of many visits to the local watering
hole in order to acquire a taste for it. In successful cases, the
process transforms a pretend mental state into a real one.
Elster observes that the motivation to change a belief is
typically the reduction of some kind of mental discomfort or
tension such as disappointment, regret, or
embarrassment.[9] Where there is inner conflict, simply being
evasive or insincere about my true beliefs might not work well
enough. When, out of politeness, I simply give the impression
that I like, say, my boss's watercolor drawings, I have not
acquired a taste for them. I maintain an internal distinction
between what I prefer and what I allow others to know that I
prefer for the prudential reason of not hurting my boss's

feelings or preserving my job. In other situations, in order to
ease my own internal tensions, I may really want to change
my belief. With adaptive belief acquisition, the change in belief
is real (which is why it is often thought to be a form of selfdeception). Some milieus are so conformist that the failure to
show anything less than sincere enthusiasm for the same
things that other insiders prefer is enough to generate
suspicion about one's inclusion in that group. When pretending
is not enough, intentional acquisition of belief may be a way of
contending with these pressures.
Compatibility with a partner or ally is another common
motivation. I minimize conflict with someone to whom I am
very close by intentionally acquiring beliefs similar to her own
and relinquishing those that lead to discord. Perhaps the most
common motivation is status. Believing or liking certain things
may enhance how I am perceived or how I perceive myself. In
the hope that liking what is liked by popular people might also
make me popular or might simply make me feel better about
myself, I intentionally acquire new, upwardly mobile beliefs.
Advertising exploits this desire to achieve through the
elevation of taste at least the feeling of a better social
position. The alignment of belief and preference with power is
probably the most common and socially dangerous motivation
for adaptive preference formation.
Intentionally acquired beliefs can also be helpful in acquiring
virtues that I do not currently possess. I adjust my desires to
what it would be correct to have or do. For instance, I may
wish to acquire the belief that I do not like to drive fast
because it wastes gas and increases risk. If I liked driving
within the speed limit, I would enjoy my trips in a more
responsible way and so be more likely to obey the speed limit.
So I decide to act as if I do not like to drive fast, sticking to
the right lane, trying to enjoy the scenery and my fellow
passengers. Through habituation, I learn to like driving slower
and assume less risk. In all these cases, I decide to believe or
prefer what, in fact, I do not. Sometimes these deliberate
changes seem suspicious, inauthentic. Sometimes not. How do
I tell the difference?
3. Fooling Myself
Real world motivations for adaptive belief formation are
complex but the illustrations from the previous section show
how some motivations are more respectable than others.
While certain examples may be judged as patently irrational
such as the fox's, others may be quite respectable, such as
intentionally acquiring a preference for driving more slowly.
Still others, such as alignment with a spouse, inhabit a gray
zone where it is not clear how we are to evaluate them. How
do we determine when an adaptive belief change is
respectable or authentic?
Elster assigns the term 'sour grapes' to non-intentional and
irrational adaptive belief acquisition.[10] Taking place behind
the back of reason, sour grapes are a trick that the mind plays
on itself in order to avoid unpleasant mental states. The fox
does not acknowledge to himself that he has changed his
preference. In sour grapes, we are, in some sense, fooling
ourselves about our beliefs or desires. In contrast to sour
grapes, authentic adaptive preference acquisition, which Elster

calls 'character planning,' happens when desires or preferences
are shaped by a more substantial process, which is
deliberative and gradual. What seems to be the irrationality of
intentional belief acquisition comes into focus as rational
against the backdrop of the process of character planning.
At first glance, sour grapes and character planning seem to be
the same thing: an adjustment of a mental state with the
difference lying only in the role of rationality in adopting the
new belief. However, a fuller description of both character
planning and sour grapes suggests that there is reason to see
the distinction as more substantial. According to Bovens, what
matters in an intentional change of preference is the depth and
comprehensiveness of the deliberative process that leads to
the change and the coherence of the change in relation to the
rest of my beliefs. When it is character planning, hence
authentic, intentional belief acquisition involves a profound
and extensive engagement with a full range of related beliefs.
In determining if I should adjust a belief or a preference, I
might examine a range of related beliefs or preferences, which
may also need adjustment. For instance, in weighing a choice
of offices, I may not immediately think that comfort is more
important than storage space. Or additional factors may come
to light, such as proximity to a noisy conference room or
jarring afternoon sunlight. Here, the process is a
thoroughgoing reconsideration of my assumptions. But when it
is sour grapes, hence inauthentic, intentional preference
change occurs without much, if any, consideration of related
beliefs. I simply want to have a more comfortable relationship
between my beliefs and my situation. So I change my
preferences without any serious consideration of how they fit
in with my other preferences. In between these two extremes
lies a continuum of judgments, some leaning more to the side
of depth and comprehensiveness, others to superficiality and
hastiness. Many cases of preference or belief change remain in
a gray area, where we cannot clearly say whether they are
cases of character planning or sour grapes. Often, responses
to internal conflict are only partial rationalizations through
which I change how I weigh some judgments, though not
thoroughly enough to count as rational preference.[11] These
cases simply can not be clearly categorized.
Change by sour grapes is typically the result of a snap
decision. Reacting to disappointment, we change our
preferences to avoid the discomfort of the unfeasible option,
but without making any broader adjustments in our beliefs or
preferences. It takes a short term view of the discomfort. As
the preference is glibly changed, its place among our overall
convictions is fragile. So if the infeasible option should
suddenly become available again, we are inclined to return to
it because our overall orientation still supports it. For example,
upon the fox's next encounter with a grape vine, it would
likely feel tension between its newly acquired distaste for
grapes and its natural attraction to them. In all likelihood,
should the next vine hang within reach, the fox's preference
for grapes would reemerge. Hasty adaptive preference
formation is superficial and opportunistic, changing as
circumstances require. Yet it can reverberate through the
whole of our beliefs or preferences in confusing ways. It may
seem out of place against the broader set of my beliefs. Now

having adopted it, should I let this new conviction lead me to
question others that I otherwise would not have? Should these
changes be made just as glibly?
In contrast, character planning involves a more gradual
process of evaluating a number of related beliefs or
preferences that I happen to have. Whereas sour grapes
addresses only the one belief that is causing the discomfort,
character planning focuses on the whole chunk of our mental
life that is relevant.[12] I may have to adjust not only the
preference but the related desires and beliefs that inform the
preference, too. Sour grapes are fragmentary; character
planning is holistic, with the potential for far-reaching and
long-lasting changes in my beliefs or preferences. Changes via
sour grapes tend to happen quickly whereas character
planning relies more on habituation, the slow integration of a
belief or preference change.
Returning to the example of my office assignment, I prefer the
large office because it has more prestige, but I prefer the
smaller office because it is cozier. In the end, I think that
prestige is more important than coziness, so I prefer the large
office. But I soon realize that I will not get the large office.
Disappointed, I proceed to adjust my preferences so that
coziness is now ranked above prestige in the hope of feeling
better about my lot. I proceed to enhance my appreciation of
coziness through as if activity, which may or may not lead to
my really enjoying it more. (It remains possible all along that I
fail to acquire the preferences that I decide I ought to have.)
If my conveniently acquired taste for cozy work spaces is
maintained over time or finds itself realized again in the
purchase of a cozy condominium, filled with cozy decorative
flourishes, and I decline the larger office when a resignation
makes it available, my snap decision on the first day of work
to prefer coziness over spaciousness can be seen in hindsight
as part of a larger project of character planning rather than
merely a reaction of sour grapes to the disappointment of the
small office. A still more far reaching project of character
planning might be to reconsider my attachment to any office
and for the game of institutional pecking order of which it is
part.
4. Acquiring Taste
Acquired tastes are not discovered facts of our mental life. To
acquire taste, we must decide to change the facts of our
mental life. Acquired tastes are taken up despite the fact that,
at the outset, we did not like them. Involving as if activity,
acquired tastes are, by definition, never immediate, direct, or
simple. In order to acquire taste, we have to make an effort to
detach from our existing preferences and allow for the
disruption of our satisfaction. We must develop new habits of
appreciation running counter to existing ones. Acquired tastes
must be chosen. If the choice is well founded, the acquired
taste is more likely to be successfully integrated into our
overall taste and hence, authentic. But we have to wait and
see if the process of acquiring taste changes us. What
ultimately matters is experience. Our taste is based on what
we find in experience. The authenticity of taste rests in part on
a respect for the facts of our feelings. We must set aside even
the most compelling case for acquiring a taste if, after

application, we still find ourselves dissatisfied what we think
we ought to like. When I say, "I don't know anything about art
but I know what I like," I am saying, "My feelings are as they
are. What you have shown me and told me has not changed
them."
With its emphasis on authentic experience and sincere
expression, taste would seem to have little room for selfdeception. Experience is free and its possibilities endless. If
you desire experience, it is hard to imagine having to fabricate
it. Yet it turns out that intentionally acquired aesthetic
preferences have an important role to play in cultivation. They
not only exist but also enjoy a degree of commendation as
acquired taste. Left unchecked, though, acquired taste can
distort aesthetic life, leaving our taste overly mediated by
fashion and authority as well as disconnected from what can
be discovered in our immediate responses.
Acquired taste is not necessarily more sophisticated than
ordinary taste. Nor must acquired taste be limited to the
development of more intellectual sorts of pleasures. A cerebral
collector of conceptual art can embark on a project of toning
down his taste through acquiring a predilection for folk
painting in the style of a Grandma Moses. Acquired taste does
not necessarily mean an improvement in the quality of objects
one esteems. For instance, in order to develop a more
sympathetic attitude toward the shortcomings of artists, a
demanding art collector can seek to acquire a taste in what
she or he might deem as inferior art. Acquired taste is
distinguished simply by a willingness to obtain a certain taste
that one does not currently have. To understand acquired
taste, we need to understand that willingness.
Taste is very frequently directed, and acquiring taste is more
widespread that just highly disciplined connoisseurs in the face
of esoteric works of art. Yet not all deliberate taste cultivation
is properly seen as acquired. Museums, radio stations, book
reviews―the very sources of our knowledge of what is on offer
to us―come packed with opinions about what is worth our
spending time and money on, in other words, what we should
like. The very process of exposing ourselves to culture or
natural beauty exposes us as well to the values of those who
are doing the offering, as well as the opinions of other
observers like friends or critics. Their opinions direct us
inevitably to look at these possibilities for experience in
favorable ways. If we take a deliberate approach to our
exposure to culture through our subscriptions, attention to
reviews, discussions with friends, regular concert and museum
attendance, and travel, we have already embarked on a
process of cultivating taste.
As we expand, revise, and refine our taste, we inevitably
engage in education, experimentation, and self-assessment.
For this reason, it is tempting to see all of cultivation as an
intentionally acquired mental state. The pursuit of culture is
somewhat deliberate and self-conscious, if only to the extent
that it requires a special effort. Not surprisingly, attempts to
satisfy curiosity and enrich my taste inevitably involve flirting
with potential as if projects. However, a frame of mind of
openness is not the same as a project to acquire a particular
preference. Putting ourselves in the position to entertain the

possibilities suggested by others is not the same as
intentionally acquiring particular preferences. Here the
distinction is between, on the one hand, finding out what I like
by a deliberate process of trial and error and, on the other,
trying to adopt preferences because I have an independent
belief about quality or the usefulness of liking something. The
process of aesthetic cultivation is not reducible to acquired
taste, though acquired taste may be a means of cultivation.
A common motivation for acquired taste is a gap between
what my taste is and what I think it ought to be. For many
people, modern art is largely an acquired taste. Let's suppose
that I wish I liked the 19th century French painter Cézanne
because I know that Cézanne's work lies as a cornerstone of
the modernist movement. Cézanne's way of describing
perception through painting and his use of color to describe
form are so groundbreaking that I consider my own lack of
enthusiasm for him as a failure. I wish to have more
enlightened taste. Unfortunately, I just don't.
Or, suppose that I wished I liked the genre of video
installation art more than I do because, as a gallery-goer, I
am likely to encounter it frequently. I am often filled with
nausea at the overbearing, pretentious nature of the videos. I
can't help but wonder if the fact that they are projected in
galleries without seating is an admission that they are
unwatchable, as if there were no expectation of viewers
staying the duration. My experience of contemporary art would
be much less dissatisfying if I liked most video installation art.
Unfortunately, I just don't.
In the case of Cézanne, I seem to be inconsistent: I remain
dissatisfied with an object that I know to be good. My
preferences resist education. I know Cézanne is great, but that
belief doesn't compel me to like him. To cope, I might try to
devalue Cézanne by adopting deflationary beliefs about his
contribution to art history. But, in this case, having too much
respect for the admirers of Cézanne and the artist's long and
important role in art history, I discount my own preferences
and wish they were otherwise. So I act as if I derived great
satisfaction from Cézanne, immersing myself in the way his
richly tentative brush work and the analytical impersonality of
his subject matter express a probing, nobly quixotic painterly
doubt, and so forth.
In the case of video installation art, my views and preferences
are consistent. However, I just wish they were different in
order to avoid a depressing feeling when viewing art whose
quality seems stand in inverse proportion to the amount of
gallery space it takes up. Or, perhaps I think that liking video
installation art will enhance my profile as a hip denizen of the
art world. Using the as if approach, I take up the habit of
always viewing each video through to the end and really
steeping myself in a manifold of boredom and annoyance,
becoming something of a connoisseur of it. I might also take
pride in my Sebastianesque ability to view the videos in their
entirety. I should be very lucky if this worked. Here, I am not
trying to change my opinions about whether the work in
question is good, but rather whether I like it. In both the case
of Cézanne and the case of video installation art, I have an
independent belief about quality but, for different reasons,

want to change the alignment of my preferences. With
Cézanne, I am in search of good taste. In the case of video
installation art, my motivation might be the avoidance of pain
or the acquisition of status.
Acquired taste can be especially beneficial when we are
confronted with difficult art. With comforting satisfactions
stripped away, difficult works of art often have an austerity,
leading us without fanfare or distraction to subtle distinctions
or astringent experiences not ordinarily encountered. As if
activity helps us get beyond the knee-jerk resistance to
unpleasant or unfamiliar art. At its best, it serves as a selfdiscipline that gives new art the benefit of the doubt. If only
because the kinds of attention required are not easily
sustained, acquired taste is often a badge of distinction
signaling membership in a self-selecting milieu.
Based on a decision to like rather than a satisfaction observed
within, acquired taste is evaluated differently than ordinary
taste. We do not usually think that our taste requires
evaluation in any way. Our tastes are just facts of mental life.
And, we discover these facts of our mental lives rather than
choose them.
Sometimes, though, my discovered or natural tastes erode in
the face of what I learn. Experience and comparison dull them.
Rational judgment intervenes, spoiling innocent pleasures and
turning them into guilty ones as they come to be seen as
inadequate. Better judgment slowly wears away delight in
unsophisticated offerings. The easy pleasures of bright colors,
photorealistic paintings, and sweet wines are challenged by
more austere satisfactions, which seem to demand more of us
and, in so doing, seem to improve us as well. Still, we might
long to preserve simple, immediate pleasures. It was in part to
restore these elemental, child-like pleasures to adult taste that
artists like Paul Klee or Jean Dubuffet developed an interest in
the art of children and the insane. The frailty of simple
pleasures suggests that we need to be discriminating about
the very acquisition of discrimination.
5. Faking Taste
Let's return to my internal conflict with Cézanne. On the one
hand, I feel that I should like Cézanne because he is among
the fathers of modern art. On the other, I feel that it is OK
that I do not like him because my experience of him lacks
certain kinds of satisfaction. To come to a decision about
whether I should engage in as if activity in order to acquire a
taste for Cézanne, I take into consideration the relevant
mental states, such as my beliefs about landscape painting,
modern art, and my feelings about related artists that I
admire or do not admire. The all-things-considered judgment
assigns a relative importance to all these mental states. This is
by no means a computational activity. Typically, our
preferences are ambiguous. The meaning of what we say, feel
or prefer is rarely perfectly clear. When I say that I do not like
Cézanne, do I mean that I do not have any pleasure in front of
a Cézanne or that the level of satisfaction that I have with
Cézanne is not what it should be for an artist of his stature?
The all-things-considered judgment sorts out these competing
accounts of my feelings. Perhaps, in my all-things-considered
judgment about Cézanne, I take into consideration not just an

interest in mainstream modern art history but also my special
concern as a painter for the overemphasis on formal structure
and surface over light and depiction in 20th century painting.
By sorting out these beliefs, I am placing my feelings for
Cézanne in a meaningful context. It turns out that, for me, the
loss of light from landscape painting in the 20th century is
somewhat unfortunate. Though my feelings for Cézanne are
not coherent when seen in the context of the standard
narrative of modern art history, they do make sense when
related to other convictions that I have. The depiction of light
in landscape painting may be more important to me than a
consistent alignment of my taste with the standard narrative.
Perhaps I adopt an alternative critical or historical point of
view in which the value of Cézanne or the narrative of
modernism in which he figures so prominently is discounted.
Accordingly, I resituate my estimation of Cézanne in a
reasonable, coherent, though admittedly idiosyncratic context.
Although I seem to be adjusting the desirability of Cézanne, I
am doing so in a way that seeks to make sense of my
experience.
This is an example of the relational reordering through
acquired taste as character planning, where I attempt to
square my feelings about Cézanne with my beliefs about other
artists, painting in general, and theories of art to which I may
or may not subscribe. This process strikes me as an authentic
case of character planning insofar as it allows for my very real
experience of Cézanne to be put in dialogue with my overall
taste, which may better fit with my experiences. The process
creates a better overall account of my responses, even though
I fail to acquire a taste for Cézanne. We can distinguish
authentic acquired taste from inauthentic acquired taste in this
way: acquired taste is authentic when it is the result of an allthings-considered, deliberative process and results in genuine
experience.
So I do not end up liking Cézanne because of some higher
order ideas about art history. However, I do choose to engage
in as if activity for those reasons. And, if, in that process, I
find that I do indeed come to like Cézanne, then, I have
acquired a taste for him. If I do not, then the tension remains.
Or, perhaps, it dissolves into a new, more coherent set of
beliefs in which Cézanne is not so crucial. Attempts to acquire
taste challenge my perceptual acuity, my ability to adopt
appropriate viewpoints, or to apply background information.
Most of all, they challenge my ability to sort through related
beliefs and feelings in order to find out what I really like (and,
by implication, who I really am). By itself, though, as if activity
cannot compel my taste. It is only an attempt to bring about
the real experiences which I aspire to have. In order to really
acquire taste, I have to 'wait and see' what happens in
experience.
Conversely, in inauthentic acquired taste, the change does not
pass by way of sufficient consideration of the relevant beliefs
and preferences that I have. Had my attempt to acquire a
taste for Cézanne rested simply on a desire to have my
feelings for this one artist fit into a standard account of art
history, without taking into consideration any other feelings or
ideas that I might have, the effort at acquired taste would

have been inauthentic, even though almost everyone would
agree that liking Cézanne is good taste. Ironically, following
the dictates of art history risks in this case making me a
culture victim: the difference between authentic and
inauthentic acquired taste lies not in the presumed quality of
the art in question but in the process by which my beliefs
change.
Just how strict should we be about assigning an inauthentic
status to a case of acquired taste? There is a danger of
priggishness here. We should resist the temptation to be too
judgmental. Acquired taste ought to be much less likely to
raise suspicions than intentionally acquired moral beliefs. After
all, with the exception of works disqualified for their moral
repugnance, truth or right action are usually not at stake in
questions of taste. When the art in question advances patently
false theories or morally repugnant attitudes as say, the
aesthetically striking but morally repugnant films of Nazi
cinematographer Leni Riefenstahl, the moral status of the work
influences whether we ought to like the works in question.
Moral deficiencies can defeat aesthetic qualities, disqualifying,
in effect, an otherwise satisfying work of art. In a reversal of
acquired taste, I might find that my ordinary tastes are so
unattractive that I would seek to free myself from them. In
these cases, I choose to dislike something that I find myself
liking. Here, my as if activity involves accentuating my
perception of those qualities which disqualify the work from
admiration.
When we find that we like something against our better
judgment, we can exercise an inhibiting distaste. The moral
dimension of the work is part of the experience, part of what
we behold or encounter, and thus what we take into
consideration. But, aside from these cases, the stakes in taste
are lower. Taste is just a matter of what we like. If we are
inclined to deceive ourselves or engage in ill-considered
attempts to like what we first find ourselves not liking, there
seems to be little to wring hands over. If all inauthentic efforts
to acquire tastes were ripe for criticism, we would be living in
a rather puritanical world. Simply trying to enjoy Rachod's
latest sample of scotch scarcely deserves the charge of
inauthenticity. Nor does seeking to enjoy the work of an artist
merely because I find it on the cover of a hip magazine merits
the charge. Built into the cultivation of taste is a certain
benefit of the doubt, an open-mindedness and willingness to
engage in as if activity. Being 'plugged in' is a way of
optimizing experience. No doubt, the cost of this attentiveness
is a fair amount of creative cacophony.
In a similar spirit, restricting taste in ways that seem benign
can pose problems that are not immediately obvious. Let's
suppose that I have a penchant for expensive, well-crafted
suits. Nothing pleases me more than a brisk walk across town
on a windy day in a very fine suit, tie and tails flapping in the
wind. But as an artist and writer, such suits are beyond my
means. So, I try to get over my attachment to these chic,
well-crafted things. I intentionally acquire a distaste for them,
emphasizing that the increase in quality scarcely justifies the
ten-fold increase in price. I remind myself that, when running
around town or slouching at my desk, fine suits are scarcely
distinguishable from the better, off-the-rack department store

models. Quality scarcely matters anyway since styles change
so rapidly. A well made suit will long outlive its moment and
will look ridiculous well before it becomes threadbare.
To control my appetite for the suits, I have shut down my
aesthetic sensibility. In the short run, there is nothing in this
attitude to have qualms about. But it can be counterproductive
as a general strategy in the long run. I risk becoming
insensible to what are nevertheless rewarding experiences to
be had from appreciating quality design and workmanship in
tailoring, albeit from a distance. This applies to all sorts of
objects that I covet but can not afford. Restraining myself
from coveting them, I can still hopefully find ways to admire
and enjoy them. Shunning beautiful things just because we
can not personally own them suggests an over-commitment to
an adaptive mental state typical of sour grapes, not character
planning. There are all kinds of things that we cannot own but
can still enjoy. Yosemite National Park's Half Dome is not in
my back yard but I still admire its uncanny sculptural beauty. I
have no reason to suffer that Frederic Church's Heart of the
Andes does not sit on my own wall. Similarly, an authentic
approach to expensive designer suits might be to enjoy their
beauty and craftsmanship when browsing in the store (which I
can consider as no different from a museum or park), while
also recognizing that they are beyond my acquisitive grasp.
Through authentic acquired taste, I develop an appreciation
for objects whose pleasures are not immediate or obvious to
me. Acquired taste is a healthy part of the process of
cultivating taste, especially when I am surrounded by plenty of
difficult art. Insofar as well cultivated taste is expansive and
curious, acquired taste can be very useful. But beyond a
certain point, acquired taste, authentic or inauthentic, is
counterproductive and sinks into bullshit. Although we should
leave plenty of leeway for open-mindedness, inauthentic
acquired taste begins to raise eyebrows when we adopt
uncritically a whole block of preferences or desires in order to
attain some identity to which we aspire.[13] Here, culture
victims use taste to feel like or appear to be something they
are not. Rather than the occasional, stray attempt to acquire a
taste motivated by curiosity or an obliging attitude towards a
friend, the culture victim's effort is wholesale acquisition of a
personality, otherwise known as posing.
Faking taste is most problematic when at the service of faking
selfhood. The ease with which we can craft a persona out of
the way we dress, the car we drive, the drink we order at the
bar, makes taste motivated by status so widespread. It is the
easiest way for someone to feel as if they have found a place
for themselves in the world. This calibration of taste to power
is the largest, most unacknowledged motivation for inauthentic
acquired taste. We see it everywhere and there is no need to
go on about it in particular. Status-motivated taste fits nicely
with Frankfurt's account of bullshit as a way of getting others
to believe not so much this or that statement, but rather, a
general perception of us. With taste, however, as we are
always our first and best audience, this deception is above all
self-deception. In the next three sections, I discuss three
primary abuses of acquired taste. They are the unreliability of
acquired taste; the inability to sense when as if activity must
be set aside; and the domination of acquired over discovered

taste.
6. The Unreliability of Acquired Taste
When I am motivated by the desire to have better taste and I
pursue this improvement with a deliberate, all-thingsconsidered approach, my acquired taste is authentic. At other
times, however, an ill-considered adjustment to my taste may
be due to an extrinsic factor, having nothing to do with the
object in question. For instance, acquiring taste for the sake of
no longer suffering bad art or enhancing my status seems
suspicious. Yet, some forms of suspect acquired taste can
nevertheless play a legitimate role in aesthetic cultivation.
There can still be value in inauthentic acquired taste, when the
consequences for my taste are positive.
Let's suppose that I meet a video installation artist and
become wildly infatuated with her. I am firmly resolved to like
her art because I do not want to deal with the inner conflict of
liking her but not liking her art. I throw myself into as if
activity, buoyed by her personal magnetism. Eventually, I not
only begin to like her work but actually develop a great
appreciation for the genre of video installation art. Despite the
fact that she never expresses the least bit of personal interest
in me, I am increasingly capable of enjoying her video
installations and those of her colleagues. I am soon able to
recognize what makes for distinctively good filmmaking in the
genre. I begin to appreciate some unconventional projections
and am altogether refreshed by looking at moving images
someplace other than on a tiny monitor or in a dreary
multiplex theater. The connections between video installation
art and other kinds of art that I like begin to emerge. I am
motivated by a crush rather than a desire for good taste. Still,
my infatuation nevertheless results in the refinement of my
taste. I end up caring more about video installation art as a
discipline than for the artist who initially captured my interest.
My motivation for acquiring the preference is suspect but,
eventually, the experience becomes rewarding. I adjust my
views of video installation art as a genre and my overall taste
is enlarged.
Personal taste often serves vanity. In one's own eyes or in the
eyes of other people, it can be a means of self-enhancement.
Expertise in wines or cigars may be a way to derive greater
satisfaction from life. Or it may be just a means of becoming
better prepared to traffic in the astute tips likely to impress
the right kind of people. Although my motivation is reputation
rather than uncovering quality, my taste can nevertheless
improve. In the process of fabricating my profile as an ultraconnoisseur, I develop a strong attachment to these pleasures,
which continue long after I realize that no one really cares
what I think about wine or cigars. If I continue along this line,
using an all-things-considered approach to gradually adjust
my preferences, I have converted from sour grapes to
character planning. Thus, non-aesthetic motivations can have
pragmatic value. The wrong motivations may be good enough
to generate the right experiences. Even when my motivations
are not respectable, they can be valuable if they eventually
lead me to better taste.
Much of what counts for enthusiasm in artistic circles comes
from extrinsic motivations. The word on the street piques our

curiosity about a film, an artist, or band. We notice that people
we admire profess an enthusiasm for something, so we follow
along. There is nothing wrong with having our ear to the
ground and listening for the enthusiasm of all kinds of people.
It would be impoverishing to dismiss the waves of enthusiasm
that ripple through the culture just for being transitory.
Embracing this enthusiasm is bound to reward. The quandary
of acquired taste emerges when we find ourselves faced with
an enthusiasm that we do not share but think we ought to.
The value of inauthentic acquired taste is limited by its
unreliability over time. Changing one belief might force me to
change others, with implications snowballing through my
preferences. If I am motivated by infatuation or status or any
other extrinsic motivation, there is little to predict what I will
want to acquire a taste for next. One day, it might be sports
cars, the next, Japanese tea ceremonies. If I decide to like
video installation art, then, I might also feel myself obliged to
reconsider other kinds of installation art or even performance
art. What if the next object of my infatuation is a critic who
happens to hate video installation art? Shall I now try to
adjust my taste once again? Just when does open-mindedness
become sycophancy? Inauthentic acquired taste can not
provide me with an answer.
Acquired taste motivated by extrinsic values cannot optimize
my experiences and improve taste overall. Whereas authentic
acquired taste produces self-knowledge through the
deliberative process, inauthentic acquired taste tends to
destroy it by burying existing preferences under acquired ones
without acknowledgment. Thus, acquired taste poses a risk to
overall taste. In authentic acquired taste, these implications
are an open part of the deliberative process. However, with
the culture victim, they are hidden beneath the surface of
hasty changes to preferences and beliefs. By focusing on
acquired taste because of the potential external rewards, I
never learn what I like and why I like it and so do not grow
beyond acquired taste to the cultivation of my own taste.
Granted, I acquire preferences and have satisfying
experiences. But they continue to be arbitrary and protean,
abandoned when my extrinsic drives lead me elsewhere. It is
unlikely that any perceptual acuity that I accidentally
developed along the way would be sustained. The conversion
to character planning and the stabilization and coherence of
taste would not likely happen. For this reason, inauthentic
acquired taste is helpful only on a sporadic basis, when the
introduction of a new interest might help to energize a
flagging aesthetic life.
7. Still Pretending?
In addition to being strenuous and tentative, as if activity is a
simulated experience. In contrast, aesthetic experience is real.
With an acquired taste, we hope that the simulation leads to
the real state. It is possible that, with even the most assiduous
efforts to acquire taste, I fail to have the sorts of experiences
to which I aspire. Should I still keep on trying to develop a
real preference for the object in question?
To acquire taste, I must end up really liking what I have
heretofore only acted as if I liked. If I do not eventually grow
into my acquired taste or drop the attempt to acquire it, then

it is not only inauthentic to keep trying, but also
counterproductive. The open-mindedness that inspired the as
if activity will actually impoverish my taste. For the very point
of aesthetic life is to have real aesthetic experience generating
real preferences and satisfactions. If I need to brace myself
with as if activity each time I am confronted with an object
that I think I should like, then there is reason to question not
only the place I want to accord the objects I am trying to like
but also my whole approach to taste and experience. It is
impossible to imagine aesthetic life without the experiences
from which preferences are generated. As if activity is a path
to real (and hopefully, better) experiences, not a replacement
for them. As if activity is a tool; it is a valuable part of the
process of becoming sympathetic to the promised satisfaction
and sorting through all of the relevant feelings and thoughts.
After a while, though, the facts about my responses must
eventually be recognized. If as if activity does not result in a
genuine response, then it must be abandoned. If it is not
abandoned, it is hard not to see it as pretentiousness or
masochism.
Until they are really acquired, the preferences I am seeking to
conjure through as if activity lie in a vestibule of taste, neither
fully part of my personal canon nor definitively excluded from
it. In the case of Cézanne, his importance to modern art
history may lead me to keep him in that vestibule forever.
Each time that I return to the museum, I seek again to see if
my feelings about Cézanne have changed by engaging in as if
activity. But walking through a crowded outdoor art fair in a
tourist destination, the time in the vestibule might be 30
seconds. I have a good reason for keeping Cézanne in the
vestibule. In the case of the amateur at the fair, I do not have
a strong reason to challenge my taste with as if activity. After
all, as if activity is somewhat strenuous. It involves a tension
and a deferral of my immediate response along with the
satisfactions it promises (even if it is just the satisfaction of
vindicating my taste with rejection). I engage in as if activity
when I believe there is a reason to doubt my responses, giving
to external authority the benefit of the doubt. However, I must
eventually discover in myself the reason for the work to be
lifted from the vestibule and ushered into my personal hall of
favorites.
The process of cultivation involves trying on different
preferences and shedding them as we see fit. In a well
organized aesthetic life, we engage in new as if projects on an
ongoing basis in order to facilitate the growth of our capacity
to experience and appreciate. Over time, as we mature and
our taste stabilizes, we benefit from our earlier as if projects,
incorporating preferences that stick while shedding those that
do not. The process of stabilization of taste distills from
everything that I acted as if I liked what I really end up liking.
Old preferences sometimes become like some old friends,
holding a titular place of intimacy in our lives rather than a
real one. Cultivation requires that we shed old preferences
when we grow beyond them or become inured to them.
Acquired taste differs from intentionally acquired moral beliefs
in that it is necessary to shed as if activity to acquire taste
sooner or later. In cases of moral judgments, if I fail to adjust
my preferences, it is still commendable that I continue to try

in the future. The speeder who once adopts the view that
speeding is bad, then lapses in that belief, should not be
criticized for redoubling his efforts to maintain it in the future.
I can imagine a moral life made up of a great deal of
intentionally acquired beliefs, which I try to adopt in the effort
to improve my moral perception and moral action. A sharp
contrast between one's moral sensibility and intentionally
acquired moral beliefs might make life hard to live. But it still
might lead to greater virtue. By contrast, a set of aesthetic
convictions made up predominantly of arduous and deliberate
as if activity designed to acquire the right taste but with little
or no real satisfaction could not possibly further the goals of
aesthetic life. Aesthetic life requires really having satisfying
experiences, or at least, real experiences. When I become a
culture victim, the process of acting as if I liked what I think I
am supposed to like never stops. Falling prey to inauthentic
acquired taste, I fail to take responsibility for the reality of my
own responses. As I stray further from the facts of my taste, it
becomes harder to tell the difference between the real
satisfactions of taste and the performance of acquired taste.
8. Knowing What I Like
Acquired taste has an important role to play in the cultivation
of taste. However, its value must be seen in relation to other
ways that tastes are generated. Not all tastes require the
application of deliberate as if activity, or, indeed, any effort at
all. Some are immediate and gratuitous. These discovered
pleasures are worth identifying and pursuing for their own
sake, even if the objects that give rise to them do not quite
cut it in the eyes of the critics and historians. When acquired
taste dominates, discovered or natural taste suffers. Acquired
taste effectively rules out the emotion of surprise. With
acquired taste, we always have an idea of what we are
supposed to like and what we should be paying attention to.
The power of surprise lies in the fact that even as an
experience is unfamiliar, exotic, I nevertheless recognize it as
very much my own. Not coming from my usual points of
orientation, it seems very much outside of me; yet somehow,
it fits. The surprise touches me, but without my already having
a clear place for it in my taste.
In discovered taste, what we discover are the facts of our own
mental life, what our preferences happen to be. We are
learning about and appreciating not just the shape of art
history or some creative discipline, but our own responses and
pleasures. No amount of harmonization of preferences with
critical or historical knowledge through acquired taste can offer
this satisfaction. The old saw, "I don't know anything about art
but I know what I like," is often marshaled as an example of
folk wisdom concerning the imperviousness of taste to
argument. It captures the sovereignty of the beholder and the
authority of experience over reason in matters of taste.
Regardless of what experts and artists foist upon their
audience, they cannot thereby compel admiration or pleasure.
Less commonly observed is the way the adage places selfknowledge at the core of the process of cultivating taste. For
the neophyte and connoisseur alike, knowing what one likes
may not be so obvious or easy as the adage suggests.
Nevertheless, self-knowledge is indispensable to aesthetic life.
Without it, the pursuit of aesthetic satisfaction from moment

to moment, object to object, becomes no more than an
endless fishing expedition, an entirely hit-or-miss affair.
It would be hard to imagine a rewarding aesthetic life in which
an individual did not have the ability to recognize and
gravitate toward the sources of satisfaction. Without this
ability, aesthetic life would be no more than a series of
haphazard encounters. Through these haphazard encounters,
it may well be possible to have aesthetic experiences but
certainly not to cultivate them. The discovery of the sources of
satisfaction can help us to orient and intensify our future
satisfactions. For this reason, the cultivation of taste requires
aesthetic self-knowledge.
When a rock band hits it big, early supporters often take a
special pride in its success. They take pains to distinguish their
support for the group from that of the Johnny-come-latelies.
Theirs, they insist, is more authentic because it was achieved
without the momentum of wide popular acceptance. Why
should it matter? The 'I-knew-them-when' rejoinder is a claim
of authenticity, an effort to set the early adopter apart from
those who now crowd the concert hall. The fact that the
latecomers' appreciation is coincident with popular acceptance
increases the possibility that the support is because of popular
acceptance (which enhances the status of a preference).
Though it might just be that popular acceptance only helped to
expose them to the new music, a crowded bandwagon raises a
cloud of suspicion.
The joy of discovering a preference can be enhanced when
there is little in one's environment encouraging it. Discovery
compounds the sense of autonomy, ratifying the intuition that
my experience is not something fabricated by cultural or
media professionals but rather a substantial encounter of my
own. These discovered aesthetic preferences form a kind of
inner canon, in which my admiration is intense, personal,
almost proprietary. Here, the harmonization of my actual
preferences and my knowledge about what I ought to like or
what it might be prudent to like plays no great role. But it is
precisely this autonomy of taste, this idea that taste is
essentially based on the facts of my own experience and
beyond the second-guessing of others, that makes inauthentic
taste so hard to pin down. The culture victim finds refuge in
the authority of personal experience, without ever really
having that experience.
The difference between acquired taste and discovered taste
highlights the notion that aesthetic experience is essentially
my own and for myself. Acquired taste is self-forgetting and
self-denying. At best, it only becomes a part of my character
as it stabilizes gradually among my overall beliefs. In contrast,
discovered taste takes the facts of my experience as the point
of departure. Whereas the cultivation of taste requires my
growing beyond my initial, primitive satisfactions, it does not
do so by disregarding them. The implication for art education
is that the most valuable thing that I can ever learn is simply
what I like. Theories of art education that emphasize
disrupting the taste of adolescents, common in universities,
are bound to fail, leaving behind confused students with work
ahead to set themselves back on track.
The dominance of acquired taste over discovered taste inhibits

our attaining an awareness of our own preferences. It sends us
into a haze of well-meaning but not often highly satisfying
efforts to like what we think we should like. If it is true that
intentionally acquired beliefs are difficult to genuinely adopt,
then an aesthetic life dominated by acquired taste will be
arduous and, given the likelihood of failure, dreary as well. No
matter how refined the taste I acquire, a personal canon
dominated by acquired taste and relatively devoid of
discovered preferences will lack the joy and excitement of
personal discovery.
9. Culture Victims
Though advertisers work hard to gain the loyalty of
consumers, suggesting that taste is easier formed than
changed, much is still wasted in their efforts. We are not
perfectly malleable. It is often hard to predict the direction of
prevailing taste. Record companies lose money. High flying
stars sink back into obscurity. Books are returned to the
warehouse for shredding. The routine failure of cultural
authority suggests that acquired taste has only a
supplementary role to play in an individual's overall taste. It
makes our taste suppler, more social, as it helps us respond to
the enthusiasm of friends and experts. However, it is by no
means the foundation of taste. The latter must be built out of
our own encounters. Regardless of the degree to which it is
mediated by external opinion and expertise, authentic taste is
built from experiences, which are real events in mental life. No
matter how much we follow reliable authorities, ultimately they
offer only directives for our own experience. As in moral and
cognitive life (though for different reasons), taste requires the
limit of the role of authority in belief formation. The problem of
inauthentic acquired taste shows us that the important role of
direct experience is not so much for the sake of the truth or
rightness of our convictions as simply their realness.
Although the main reason to limit the role of acquired taste is
the authenticity of personal experience, there is another,
institutional reason. When, in the management of cultural
institutions, authentic taste goes out the window and is
replaced with as if activity and inauthentic acquired taste,
often motivated by fashion, faddish theories, or a fatuous
attraction to power, then the offerings will be demoralizing to
the rest of us. Over the long haul, when professionals only
pretend to like what they offer to the public, the results are
sure to be unconvincing. Inevitably, inauthentic taste
undermines the legitimacy of cultural institutions, which rests
in part on the assumption that there is someone behind the
curtain genuinely having something like the worthwhile
experiences that we are promised.
The widespread charge that when it comes to contemporary
art, the emperor has no clothes, is an observation of the
ubiquity of inauthentic acquired taste. But why would not the
response be the old saw, "There is no disputing taste" or the
other common formulation, "There is no accounting for taste"?
A theory of acquired taste may serve as the basis for disputing
taste not so much for correctness as realness or authenticity.
When we observe acquired taste that seems to be extrinsically
motivated, generated by hasty decisions, exhibiting lack of
coherence with the rest of the person's taste, or an over-

alignment with fashion or authority, we have reason to pause.
But more is to be gained by taking the enthusiasms of other
people at more or less face value, with the hope of learning
and growing from them. We can enjoy the 'contact-high' of
their enthusiasm, reveling in the connections made with other
people through them, and moving on when we find ourselves
uninspired. In the cultivation of taste, what we are in pursuit
of is our own experience and, through it to the extent possible,
our own satisfaction.
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